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How does technological progress in financial intermediation affect the economy? To address this question
a costly-state verification framework is embedded into a standard growth model. In particular, financial
intermediaries can invest resources to monitor the returns earned by firms. The inability to monitor
perfectly leads to firms earning rents. Undeserving firms are financed, while deserving ones are under
funded. A more efficient monitoring technology squeezes the rents earned by firms. With technological
advance in the financial sector, the economy moves continuously from a credit-rationing equilibrium
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Financial development ￿accelerates economic growth and improves economic performance
to the extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e. to the place in
the economic system where the funds will earn the highest social return,￿ noted Goldsmith
(1969, p. 400) some thirty ￿ve years ago. Ever since then, economists have been developing
theories and searching for empirical evidence connecting ￿nancial and economic development
together. Information production plays a key role in this process of steering of funds to the
highest valued users in two ways. First, intermediaries collect and analyze information
about potential investments before funds are committed by savers. Second, after savers
have devoted their funds to investment, intermediaries monitor the activities of borrowers
to ensure that the best return is attained. If the costs of information production drop, then
￿nancial intermediation should become more e¢ cient with an associated improvement in
economic performance. The current analysis provides a theoretical model of how reductions
in the cost of information processing allow for more e¢ cient capital allocation. A numerical
example illustrates that the impact, of a reduction in the cost of information processing, on
the e¢ cacy of intermediation might be quite large.
1.1 Facts
Some stylized facts of the kind illustrated in Figure 1 were o⁄ered by Goldsmith (1969) to
suggest that ￿nancial intermediation might be important: First, the ratio of business debt
to GDP has risen. In 1952 business debt was 30% of GDP.1 Today it is 65%. Second, the
value of ￿rms relative to GDP has also moved up. In 1951 ￿rms were worth 50% of GDP,
while today they are valued at 176%. Third, the size of the ￿nancial sector has increased.
Output of the ￿nancial sector as a percentage of GDP rose from 2% in 1950 to 8% today.
All of this may be evidence of improved intermediation; now it is easier for ￿rms to enter
stock and bond markets and raise funds.
1 Data sources are provided in Appendix 11.2.
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Figure 1: Trends in ￿nancial intermediation
Direct measures of the impact of improved e¢ ciency in the ￿nancial system on the
economy are hard to come by. Improvements in the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial intermediation,
due to improved information production, are likely to reduce the spread between the internal
rate of return on investment in ￿rms and the rate of return on savings received by savers.
The spread between these returns re￿ ects the costs of intermediation. This spread will
include the costs of ex ante information gathering about investment projects, the ex post
information costs of policing investments, and the costs of misappropriation of savers￿ s funds
by management, unions, etc. that arise in a world with imperfect information. One may
observe little change in the rate of return earned by savers over time, because aggregate
savings will adjust in equilibrium so that this return re￿ ects savers￿rates of time preference.
If the wedge between the internal rate of return earned by ￿rms and the rate of return
received by savers falls, due to more e⁄ective intermediation, then the capital stock in the
economy should rise. Indeed, there is some evidence that this may be the case. Figure 2
plots the capital-to-GDP ratio for the business sector of the economy, where the capital stock
includes intangible investments such as ￿rms￿research and development, following the lead























Figure 2: Capital-to-GDP ratio, 1947-2002
of Corrado et al. (2006). It has increased signi￿cantly over the postwar period. Of course, an
economy￿ s capital-to-GDP ratio may rise on other accounts, too. For example, lower taxes
on capital income should increase it, as well as declines in the price of capital goods due to
investment-speci￿c technological advance. To the extent that capital stock measures exclude
intangibles, or fail to incorporate improvements in quality due to embodied technological
progress, then more e⁄ective intermediation will be picked up as increases in productivity,
instead.
There is evidence of the above phenomena in the cross-country data, too. Figure 3
plots the relationship between interest-rate spreads and output for a sample of 49 countries.
As can be seen, there is a negative association. Additionally, capital-to-output ratios and
output are positively related, in a sample of 48 countries. Hence, there is evidence of capital
deepening both in the US time-series data and in the cross-country data.
While the above facts are stylized, to be sure, it will be noted that empirical researchers
have used increasingly sophisticated methods to tease out the relationship between ￿nancial
intermediation and growth. This literature is surveyed masterfully by Levine (2005). The



























































Figure 3: The cross-country relationship between per-capita GDP, on the one hand, and
interest-rate spreads and capital-output ratios on the other
upshot is that ￿nancial development has a causal e⁄ect on economic development; specif-
ically, ￿nancial development leads to higher rates of growth in income and productivity.
Additionally, it may be of secondary importance whether the source of the development in
￿nancial systems arises from improvements in banks, stock markets or bond markets.
1.2 The Analysis
To address the impact that ￿nancial innovation has on economic development, a model is
presented with four key features. First, output is produced by ￿rms using capital and labor.
The funds for capital must be raised outside of ￿rms. The production technology is subject
to idiosyncratic randomness, the realized state of which is private information to the ￿rm.
There is a distribution, across ￿rms, over the distribution of these returns. That is, some
￿rms may have investment projects that o⁄er low-expected returns with little variance, while
others may have projects that yield high-expected returns with a large variance.
Second, the production technologies used by ￿rms are governed by constant returns to
scale. This assumption is important. In the absence of ￿nancial market frictions no rents
will be earned on production. Additionally, in a frictionless world only ￿rms o⁄ering the
4highest expected return will be funded. With ￿nancial market frictions the cost of capital
for the best projects is too high, and simultaneously ine¢ cient projects are funded.
Third, there are competitive ￿nancial intermediaries in the economy that supply the
capital to ￿rms needed for production. These intermediaries write lending contracts with
￿rms that mitigate the private information problem. An important feature of these contracts
is the ability of the intermediary to monitor the revenue of the ￿rm. Without the ability
to monitor an intermediary cannot condition loan payments on the state of a ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts,
since the latter always has an incentive to report the worst outcome in order to keep as much
of the proceeds for itself as possible. Here, an equilibrium with credit rationing will prevail,
and only one type of ￿rm will be funded. This is the type that earns the most pro￿ts in
its worst state of world. In a sense, only the safest type of ￿rm is funded in the absence of
monitoring.
Fourth, the monitoring technology improves over time due to technological innovation
in the ￿nancial sector. At low levels of productivity in the ￿nancial sector, the economy
rests in an equilibrium where loans are not monitored and credit is rationed. If technological
improvement in the ￿nancial sector occurs at a faster pace than in the rest of the economy,
then ￿nancial intermediation becomes more e¢ cient. Loans are monitored more diligently
and the rents earned by ￿rms shrink. Additionally, lending activity will change along both
extensive and intensive margins. Projects with high- (low-) expected returns will now receive
more (less) funds. Those investments with the lowest expected returns will be cut. At high
levels of e¢ ciency in the ￿nancial sector the economy approaches the ￿rst-best equilibrium
achieved in a world without informational frictions.
1.3 Literature Review
At the heart of the framework developed here is a costly-state veri￿cation model that has its
roots in the work of Townsend (1979) and Williamson (1986). Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Williamson (1987) have used such a framework for business cycle analysis. The goal here
is study economic development. The costly-state veri￿cation model employed here di⁄ers
5from the standard paradigm. The auditing technology is random, albeit in a di⁄erent sense
than Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1994). Speci￿cally, the probability
of detecting malfeasance depends upon the amount of resources devoted to the activity and
the e¢ ciency of the monitoring technology. As in Boyd and Prescott (1986), the contract
is designed to induce truthful behavior by borrowers. This reformulation of the standard
costly-state veri￿cation model has several appealing features. First, it leads to a determinate
loan size for each type of funded ￿rm in the ex ante distribution over ￿rms.2 Intermediaries
don￿ t just fund projects with the highest expected returns because the amount of monitoring
required increases with loan size and there are decreasing returns to the monitoring activity.
Second, a simple threshold rule for funding results. All projects with an expected return at
least as great as the market rate of interest are funded. Third, funding is increasing in a
project￿ s expected return, and is decreasing in its risk.
The model connects the state of development in the ￿nancial system to economic activity,
as do Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Levine (1991), Marcet
and Marimon (1992), and Townsend and Ueda (2006).3 In the current analysis, the
ability of the ￿nancial system to produce information about borrowers is continually evolving
due to technological progress in information production. The fourth bene￿t of the ￿ exible
monitoring technology adopted here is that it allows the economy, with a distribution of
￿rm types, to move smoothly as function of the costs of information acquisition from a
credit-rationing equilibrium to the ￿rst-best equilibrium. A numerical example presented
2 Loan size cancels out of the constraints associated with problems (3.2) and (4.5) in Williamson (1986).
This isn￿ t a problem in Williamson (1986) because project size is ￿xed. In a model with just one type of
￿rm and a variable project size it is reasonable to assume that each ex ante identical ￿rm just takes its share
of aggregate saving￿ Chakraborty and Lahiri (2006). This assumption will be less appealing when there
are many ex ante ￿rm types, each with di⁄erent risk/return characteristics. Alternatively, in the standard
costly-state veri￿cation model, loan size can be limited by requiring some internal ￿nance￿ Khan (2001).
There, loan size is proportional to the level of internal ￿nance. This assumption is less attractive in the
environment to be studied here because the properties of funding as a function of a project￿ s risk/return
characteristics are unclear (this is not important in a model with a lone ex ante ￿rm type).
3 The papers mentioned by Chakraborty and Lahiri (2006) and Khan (1999) also examine this relation-
ship. The literature is large, so many papers are necessarily omitted. For an excellent survey see Levine
(2005).
6here suggests that the state of ￿nancial system can have a large impact on the economy.
Whether or not this implication will be robust to future extensions remains to be seen, but
it appears to derive from the fact that in worlds with imperfect information the lure for
rents by ￿rms with less than best-practice technologies will have a detrimental impact on
aggregate economic activity.
2 The Environment
Imagine a world made up of three types of agents: consumer/workers, ￿rms and ￿nancial
intermediaries. In a nutshell, ￿rms produce output using capital and labor. The con-
sumer/worker supplies the labor, and intermediaries the capital. Financial intermediaries
raise the funds for capital from consumer/workers. They also use labor in their lending
activity. Output is used for consumption by consumer/workers and for investment in capital
by intermediaries. Each of these features of the economy will now be described in more
detail.
2.1 The Representative Agent




t lnct; with 0 < ￿ < 1,
where ct denotes period-t consumption. The individual has one unit of labor, which earns the
wage rate wt on the market. In any given period the consumer/worker has two additional
sources of income. First, he earns interest on any ￿nancial assets, at, purchased in the
previous period. A unit of consumption invested with a ￿nancial intermediary in period
t￿1 realizes the net return b rt in period t. Second, he earns the pro￿ts or dividends, dt, from
the ￿rms that he owns.
72.2 Firms




where k and l represent the inputs of capital and labor used in production. The variable
￿ gives the productivity level of the ￿rm￿ s production process. Productivity is a random
variable drawn from a two-point vector ￿ ￿ (￿1;￿2) with ￿1 < ￿2. Let Pr(￿ = ￿1) = ￿1
and Pr(￿ = ￿2) = ￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿1. The mean and variance of ￿ are given by ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2
and ￿1￿2(￿1 ￿ ￿2)2, respectively.4 Thus, for a given set of probabilities these statistics
di⁄er in accordance with the values speci￿ed for ￿1 and ￿2. Now, the vector from which
the productivities, ￿, are drawn from di⁄ers across ￿rms. In particular, suppose that ￿rms
in the economy are distributed over productivities in line with the distribution function
F : T ! [0;1], where T v R2
+ and
F(x;y) = Pr(￿1 ￿ x;￿2 ￿ y).
Think of this distribution as somehow specifying a trade-o⁄between the mean and variance
of project returns. Due to technological progress in the production sector of the economy,
this distribution will evolve over time.
The ￿rm borrows capital, k, from the intermediary before it observes the technology
shock, ￿. It does this with both parties knowing its type, ￿. It can employ labor, at the
wage rate w, after it sees the realization for ￿. In order to ￿nance its use of capital the
￿rm must enter into a contract with a ￿nancial intermediary. Suppose that a ￿rm can only
borrow from one intermediary at a time.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
There is a competitive intermediation sector that borrows funds from consumers and lends
capital to ￿rms. While the intermediary knows a ￿rm￿ s type it cannot observe the state of
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2 ￿ 2￿1￿2] = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1(￿1 ￿ ￿2)2.
8a ￿rm￿ s business either costlessly or perfectly.5 That is, the intermediary cannot costlessly
observe ￿, o and l. The ￿rm will make a report to the intermediary about its business
situation. The intermediary can devote some resources in order to assess the veracity of
this report. The payments, p, from a ￿rm to the intermediary will be conditioned both
upon the report made by former, and the outcome of any monitoring activity done by latter.
Figure 4 illustrates the ￿ ow of funds in the economy. By channelling funds through ￿nancial
intermediaries consumers avoid a costly duplication of monitoring e⁄ort that would occur
in an equilibrium with direct lending between them and ￿rms￿ see Williamson (1986) for
more detail.6
Suppose a ￿rm reports that the productivity on its project in a given period is ￿j, which
may di⁄er from the true state ￿i. The intermediary can devote resources, mj, to verify this
claim. The probability of detecting fraud is increasing in the amount of resources devoted
to this activity. In particular, let Pij(mj=k) denote the probability that the ￿rm is caught
cheating conditional on: (1) the true realization of productivity is ￿i; (2) the ￿rm makes
a report of ￿j; (3) the intermediary spends mj in monitoring; (4) the size of the loan is k.
The function Pij(mj=k) is assumed to be monotonically increasing in mj=k. Additionally,
let Pij(mj=k) = 0 if the ￿rm truthfully reports that its type is ￿i.
5 One could potentially have a screening stage where the intermediary veri￿es the initial type of a ￿rm.
6 A theory of intermediation is not being developed here. Rather an institutional structure is imposed
that is intended to capture in a simple way some of the informational frictions present in the real world, in
particular the divergence in incentives between the owners of ￿rms and their lenders in worlds with private
information. Strictly speaking, in the current setting the owners of ￿rms are also ultimately the lenders
of funds to these businesses. Therefore, intermediaries should buy all of the ￿rms in economy so that the
incentives between the operator and owners of ￿rms and the lenders of funds to businesses coincide. One
could also model the owners of ￿rms as being some separate group of agents. Then, the rents they earn
would be a random variable. This set of individuals would have uncertainty in their consumption plans.
One could assume that such agents are risk neutral, as in Williamson (1986). The institutional structure








Figure 4: The ￿ ow of funds in the economy
A convenient formulation for Pij(mj=k) is
Pij(mj=k) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 ￿ 1
(￿mj=k)  < 1; with 0 <   < 1;
for a report ￿j 6= ￿i and mj=k > 1=￿;
0;
for a report ￿j = ￿i or mj=k ￿ 1=￿:
This speci￿cation requires that some threshold level of monitoring, mj > k=￿, must be
exceeded to detect cheating.
Monitoring is a produced good, measured in units of consumption. The production of
monitoring is project speci￿c. Monitoring produced for detecting fraud in one project cannot
be used in a di⁄erent one. Let monitoring be produced in line with the production function
m = zl
1=￿
m ; with 0 ￿ 1=￿ ￿ 1,
where lm represents the amount of labor employed in this activity. The cost function,
10C(m=z;w), associated with monitoring is given by
C(m=z;w) = w(m=z)
￿:
Costs are linear in wages, w. With diminishing returns to scale in the production (1=￿ < 1)
the cost function is increasing and convex in the amount of monitoring, m, and decreasing
and convex in the state of the intermediation technology, z.
Now, exactly which ￿rms are funded depends on three things: (1) the ￿rm￿ s type, ￿ ;
(2) the state of the monitoring technology in the ￿nancial intermediation sector, z; (3) the
expense of monitoring e⁄ort as re￿ ected by the wage, w. As will be seen, when the variance
of a ￿rm￿ s project becomes larger, the informational problems associated with contracting
become more severe. Therefore, high variance projects are less likely to get funded, ceteris
paribus.
3 Utility Maximization by Consumers
The representative consumer/worker￿ s goal in life is to maximize his lifetime utility. To do
this, each period the consumer picks today￿ s consumption, c, and assets to carry over for
tomorrow, a0. This gives rise to the standard dynamic programming problem:
J(a) = max





0 = w + (1 + b r)a + d:
The value function implicitly depends upon wages, w, dividends, d, and the interest rate, b r.
In the deterministic model studied, these will all be functions of time, the model￿ s primal
state variable. This dependence of the value function upon time is implicitly indicated
through the use of the prime symbol attached to J, which di⁄erentiates its functional form
tomorrow from its form today. The ￿rst-order condition associated with this problem leads
to the well-known Euler equation
1
c




114 Pro￿t Maximization by Firms
As prelude to solving the contracting problem between a ￿rm and a ￿nancial intermediary,
consider the problem faced by a ￿rm that receives a loan in terms of capital in the amount
k. Recall that the ￿rm hires labor after it sees the realization of its technology shock, ￿. It
will do this in a manner so as to maximize its pro￿ts. In other words, the ￿rm will solve the





1￿￿ ￿ wlg: (P2)












Substituting the solution for l into the maximand and solving yields the unit return function,
R(￿;w), or




Think about ri = R(￿i;w) as giving the gross rate of return on a unit of capital invested in
the ￿rm given that state ￿i occurs. The expected gross rate of return will be ￿1r1 + ￿2r2,
while the variance reads ￿1￿2(r1 ￿ r2)2.
5 The Financial Contract
A contract between a ￿rm and an intermediary is summarized by the quadruple fk;pj;pij;mjg.
Here k represents the amount of capital lent by the intermediary to the ￿rm, pj is the ￿rm￿ s
payment to the intermediary if it reports ￿j and is not found cheating, pij is payment to the
bank if the borrower reports ￿j and monitoring reveals that productivity is ￿i 6= ￿j, and mj
is the intermediary￿ s monitoring e⁄ort when ￿j is reported. Denote the value of the ￿rm￿ s
outside option by v.
12The intermediary chooses the details of the ￿nancial contract, fk;pj;pij;mjg, to max-
imize its pro￿ts. The contract is designed to have two features: (1) it entices truthful
reporting by ￿rms; (2) it o⁄ers ￿rms an expected return of v. The optimization problem is
I(￿;v) ￿ max
p1;p2;p12;p21;m1;m2;k




p1 ￿ r1k; (3)
p2 ￿ r2k; (4)
p12 ￿ r1k; (5)
p21 ￿ r2k; (6)
[1 ￿ P12(m2=k)](r1k ￿ p2) + P12(m2=k)(r1k ￿ p12) ￿ r1k ￿ p1; (7)
[1 ￿ P21(m1=k)](r2k ￿ p1) + P21(m1=k)(r2k ￿ p21) ￿ r2k ￿ p2; (8)
and
￿1(r1k ￿ p1) + ￿2(r2k ￿ p2) = v: (9)
Note that the cost of capital, e r, is given by e r = b r + ￿; i.e., the interest paid to investors
plus the depreciation on capital. The ￿rst four constraints just say the intermediary cannot
demand more than the ￿rm earns; that is, the ￿rm has limited liability. Equations (7) and (8)
are the incentive-compatibility constraints. Take (8). This simply states that the expected
return to the ￿rm from reporting state one when it actually is in state two, as given by the
left-hand side, must be less than telling the truth, as represented by the right-hand side.
Observe that the constraint set is not convex due to the way that m1 enters (8). Therefore,
the second-order conditions for the maximization problem are important to consider. The
last constraint (9) speci￿es that the contract must o⁄er the ￿rm an expected return equal to
v, its option value outside. A ￿rm￿ s outside option is the expected return that it could earn
on a loan from another intermediary. This will be determined in equilibrium. Finally, note
the solution for fpj;pij;mj;kg is contingent upon the ￿rm￿ s type, ￿ = (￿1;￿2). To conserve
on notation, this dependence is generally suppressed.
13The lemma below characterizes the solution to the above optimization problem.
Lemma 1 The solution to problem (P3) is described by:
1. The size of the loan from the intermediary to the ￿rm, k, is
k =
v
￿2(r2 ￿ r1)[1 ￿ P21(m1=k)]
: (10)











￿ ￿ vg; (P4)
where k can be eliminated using (10) above.
(a) Monitoring in the bad state is simply given by
m1 = (m1=k)k;
where m1=k solves (P4).
(b) The intermediary does not monitor when the ￿rm reports a good state so that
m2 = 0: (11)
3. The payment schedule is
p1 = r1k; (12)
p2 = r2k ￿ v=￿2; (13)
p12 = r1k; (14)
p21 = r2k: (15)
Proof. See Appendix 11.1.
It is intuitive that there are no bene￿ts to the ￿rm from claiming a better outcome than
it actually realizes, since it will only have to pay the intermediary more. The intermediary
would like to reduce the ￿rm￿ s incentive to report being in the low state. So, suppose the
￿rm reports a low state. If cheating is not detected, then the ￿rm pays all of its revenue
(sans labor cost) that would be realized in the low state￿ see (12). If the ￿rm is caught
cheating, then it must surrender all of the revenue (sans labor cost) that it earns in the high
14state￿ see (15). Note that due to the incentive-compatibility constraints a false report will
never occur so that the payments shown by (14) and (15) will never occur in equilibrium.
The contract speci￿es that the intermediary should only monitor the ￿rm when it reports
a bad outcome (state 1) on its project￿ see (11). Monitoring in the low state is done to max-
imize the intermediary￿ s pro￿ts, subject to the incentive-cum-promising-keeping constraint
(10), as problem (P4) dictates. Note that the higher is the value of the ￿rm, v, the bigger
must be the loan, k, to satisfy the incentive-cum-promising-keeping constraint (10). This
constraint (10) ensures that the contract provides the ￿rm an expected return equal to what
it would earn if it misrepresented the outcome in the good state, ￿2(r2￿r1)[1￿P21(m1=k)]k.
Furthermore, this expected return is set equal to the ￿rm￿ s outside option, v. The size of
the loan, k, is increasing in the amount of monitoring that occurs in the low state, m1=k.
This transpires since the probability of the ￿rm not getting caught from misrepresenting its
revenues, 1 ￿ P21(m1=k), is decreasing in the intermediary￿ s monitoring activity.
Now, a ￿nancial contract will be o⁄ered by an intermediary to a ￿rm only if it yields
the former nonnegative pro￿ts, I(￿;v) ￿ 0. It turns out that a necessary condition for a
contract to yield nonnegative pro￿ts, when r1 < e r, is for the ￿rm to devote more than the
minimal level of resources per unit of funds lent, 1=￿, to monitoring a report of a bad state.
If this is not done then an incentive-compatible contract will not be viable, since it involves
o⁄ering the ￿rm too much of a reward in order to entice a truthful report in the good state.
Lemma 2 I(￿;v) < 0 in Problem (P4) when either m1=k = 0 or m1=k = 1=￿, for all v > 0
and r1 < e r.
Proof. The argument is presented in Appendix 11.1.
5.1 Monitored Loans, r1 < e r
Assume that r1 < e r. The situation where r1 ￿ e r will be analyzed later. It will be estab-
lished that when r1 = e r a loan will not be monitored. This can only occur in an equilib-
rium with credit rationing. It will also be shown that an equilibrium with r1 > e r cannot
15exist. Returning to the maintained hypothesis of r1 < e r, focus can be directed toward
￿nding an interior solution for (P4) in light of the above lemma. To this end, substituting
the constraint (10) into the problem￿ s objective function, while making use of the formula
[1 ￿ P21 (m1=k)]





























The ￿rst- and second-order conditions linked to this maximization problem are
 qv(m1=k)
 ￿1 ￿ ( ￿ + ￿)sv
￿(m1=k)
 ￿+￿￿1=z
￿ = 0; (16)
and
(  ￿ 1) qv(m1=k)




The second-order condition is automatically satis￿ed since   < 1 and ￿ > 1.
Plugging in the expressions for q and s into the ￿rst-order condition leads to
m1=k = f
 
( ￿ + ￿)








1=( ￿+￿￿ ): (17)
Lemma 3 The interior solution (17) for the optimal level of monitoring per unit of capital,
m1=k, satis￿es the following properties (for a given wage rate, w):
1. m1=k is:
(a) increasing in the state of the monitoring technology, z, the expected net return,
￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r, and the variance of the return, r2 ￿ r1;
(b) decreasing in the value of the ￿rm, v.
2. m1=k ! 1, as v ! 0.
3. m1=k > 1=￿ if and only if v < v, where




16Proof. Again, see Appendix 11.1.
It￿ s intuitive that when the state of the monitoring technology, z, improves more monitoring
will be undertaken. When the variance of project returns, r2 ￿ r1, is big the bene￿ts to a
￿rm from under reporting income are large. Hence, it pays for the intermediary to do more
monitoring. When expected net returns on a project, ￿1r1+￿2r2￿e r, move up there are more
pro￿ts to be earned for a given level of investment. The marginal bene￿t from monitoring
rises; i.e., q increases in the monitoring problem (P5). In fact, note from (10) that loan size,
k, cannot increase without an increase in monitoring. Thus, without extra monitoring the
intermediary would be unable to take advantage of any improvement in expected net returns,
￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r. This occurs because k is locked in by the incentive and promising-keeping
constraints (8) and (9). More monitoring relaxes the incentive constraint. Finally, as the
value of the ￿rm, v, rises the size of the loan that the intermediary must make to ful￿ll the
promising keeping constraint grows. As a result, the cost of monitoring rises. Monitoring
per unit of loan drops as a consequence. At some point the threshold level of monitoring
can no longer be met.
Finally, the size of the loan speci￿ed by the optimal contract can be uncovered by sub-







 ￿ + ￿
(￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r)
￿1w
]
 =( ￿+￿￿ )
￿ z
￿ =( ￿+￿￿ )v
￿=( ￿+￿￿ ): (18)
As can be seen, the optimal contract speci￿es that size of the loan will be increasing in the
￿rm￿ s value, v, and the net return on its project ￿1r1+￿2r2￿e r. More money will be lent the
better is the state of technology in the ￿nancial sector, z. Last, loan size will be decreasing
in the variance of the ￿rm￿ s project, r2 ￿ r1. All of these statements take the wage rate,
w, as given. The intuition underlying these results can be constructed along similar lines to
that just provided for the monitoring equation.
176 Competitive Financial Intermediation
In the economy there is perfect competition in the ￿nancial sector. Consequently, an inter-
mediary must o⁄er a contract that maximizes a ￿rm￿ s value, subject to the restriction that
the former does not incur a loss. If an intermediary failed to do so it would be undercut
by others. The upshot is that intermediaries will make zero pro￿ts on each type of loan.
The implications of perfect competition will now be analyzed. Key questions are: (i) Which
￿rms will get funded? (ii) What will be the loan size?
6.1 Monitored Loans, r1 < e r
Suppose that r1 < e r for some project type under consideration. By Lemma 2 any loan to a
￿rm of this type will be monitored. The pro￿t function for the intermediary, when it funds
a ￿rm of type ￿, can be expressed with a little work as




￿ =( ￿+￿￿ )(
1
 ￿ + ￿
)
( ￿+￿)=( ￿+￿￿ )q
( ￿+￿)=( ￿+￿￿ )
￿s
￿ =( ￿+￿￿ )z
￿ =( ￿+￿￿ )v
￿=( ￿+￿￿ ) ￿ v: (19)
Lemma 4 The intermediary￿ s pro￿t function, I(￿;v), for monitored loans has the following
properties on the domain [0;V (￿)]:
1. I(￿;0) = 0,
2. limv!0 dI(￿;v)=dv = 1,
3. d2I(￿;v)=dv2 < 0,
4. I(￿;V (￿)) < 0.
Proof. Refer to Appendix 11.1.
Figure 5 plots the I(￿;v) function, as shown by the solid line. The lemma establishes
that this function both starts and grows from the origin (Points 1 and 2), is strictly concave
(Point 3), and then eventually declines and cuts the axis (Points 3 and 4). The dashed line
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Figure 5: The pro￿t function for the ￿nancial intermediary, I(￿;v)
would always be negative, in accord with Lemma 2.7 When v = V (￿) the pro￿t realized
at the corner of the interior solution m1=k = 1=￿ must lie below that obtained at the corner
m1=k = 0. This is because in both solutions P12(m1=k) = 0, but the former involves paying
monitoring costs while the latter does not. With a little e⁄ort, it can be shown that an
increase in wages from w to w0 will cause this function to shift down￿ see the dashed line in
the Figure 6. The expected pro￿ts on any lending are reduced, in accordance with problem
(P4), since ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 will drop. A rise in z to z0 will result in I(￿;v) shifting upward￿
see the dashed and dotted line in Figure 6. This transpires because lending becomes more
pro￿table when monitoring is less expensive.
6.1.1 The Loan Portfolio
Which monitored projects will be funded and how much will they get? Let A(w) denote the
set of funded, monitored projects. It turns out that the active set of monitored projects,
7 The proof of the lemma establishes that this line is linear.
19I(¿;v; ~ r;w;z0 > z)
I(¿;v; ~ r;w;z)
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Figure 6: The impact of an increase in wages, w, and monitoring e¢ ciency, z, on pro￿ts,
I(￿;v;e r;w;z)
20A(w), is de￿ned by A(w) = f￿ : ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r > 0g: A ￿rm is funded if and only if it can
make positive expected pro￿ts from any capital invested. From problem (P4), it is easy to
see that






2 ] ￿ e r ￿ 0:
Observe that pro￿ts are decreasing in wages. A type-￿ ￿rm will operate when w ￿ w, and
will not otherwise, where the cuto⁄ wage, w, is speci￿ed by










So, the set of active projects A(w) can be expressed equivalently as
A(w) = f￿ : ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r > 0g or A(w) = f￿ : w < W(￿)g. (21)
The active set depends on the wage because ri = R(￿i;w). It contracts (expands) with a rise
(decrease) in the real wage, since R(￿i;w) is decreasing in w. Therefore, as was mentioned
in the introduction, a simple threshold rule exists for funding, as characterized by (21).
If the intermediation sector is competitive then a loan contract must maximize the value
of the ￿rm, v, subject to the fact that intermediary can￿ t make a loss. If it didn￿ t do this,
the intermediary could be undercut by a competitor. Hence, v is simply given by
v = V (￿) = argmax
x fx : I(￿;x) ￿ 0g:
By Figure 5, it is clear that for any ￿rm in the active set: (i) V (￿) > 0; (ii) V (￿) is unique;
(iii) V (￿) solves I(￿;V (￿)) = 0. Note from (10) that k(￿) > 0 if and only if V (￿) > 0; a
funded ￿rm will have value and conversely so, too.
The lemma below takes stock of the discussion so far regarding the loan portfolio.
Lemma 5 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a type-￿ ￿rm to be active, or for k(￿) > 0
and V (￿) > 0, is that ￿ 2 A(w).
Proof. Those interested should go to Appendix 11.1.
21Intuitively, from equation (19) it can be seen that if ￿1r1+￿2r2￿e r > 0 (so that q > 0) then
there will exist a v > 0 that gives positive pro￿ts for the intermediary. Hence, from Figure 5
it is apparent that the ￿rm will be funded. When ￿1r1 +￿2r2 ￿e r < 0 (implying q < 0) then
from (19) there does not exist an interior solution that generates positive pro￿ts for any v.
When a ￿rm is in the active set, it can be deduced from (19) that v will be given by
v = V (￿) = ( ￿ + ￿ ￿  )
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￿ ￿ : (22)
Next, calculate the level of investment in a ￿rm. To do so, plug the solution for v into
formula (18), while making use of the de￿nitions for q and s, to obtain
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 ￿=( ￿￿ ):
Equation (23) gives a determinate loan size for each type of funded project. Furthermore,
funding is increasing in a project￿ s expected return and is decreasing in its volatility.
Lemma 6 The level of investment in a ￿rm, k, is increasing in its expected net return,
￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r, and the state of technology in the ￿nancial sector, z, and is decreasing in
the variance of the return, r2 ￿ r1 (holding the wage rate, w, ￿xed).
Figure 7 portrays the loan portfolio. Here, only projects with an expected return greater
than 6.5, the threshold, are funded. For projects in the active set (that is with a mean return
greater than 6.5) the size of the loan increases with the expected return and decreases with
the variance. Now, why should intermediaries fund more than one type of project? That
is, why don￿ t they invest solely in the projects that o⁄er the highest rate of return? The
reasoning is simple. The incentive for a ￿rm to misrepresent its earnings in the good state
is increasing in the size of the loan, k, holding monitoring e⁄ort m1 ￿xed. Speci￿cally, the
expected gain from misrepresenting pro￿ts in the good state is ￿2[1￿P21(m1=k)](r2￿r1)k￿
cf. (10). The contract sets this exactly equal to the expected bene￿t from telling the truth,
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Figure 7: The loan portfolio
(8), unless monitoring e⁄ort, m1, is increased as well. From Problem (P4) it is apparent that
marginal revenue for a given loan type is decreasing in monitoring e⁄ort, while marginal cost
is increasing in it. Therefore, there is a unique loan size for each type of project.
6.2 Unmonitored Loans, r1 ￿ e r
Attention is now directed toward the situation where r1 ￿ e r for some types of projects. Here
the return on a loan to the ￿rm in its worst state of nature is at least as large as the cost of
capital, e r. Therefore, the intermediary does not have to monitor a loan in order to prevent
a loss, as was necessary when r1 < e r￿ recall Lemma 2. Indeed, it turns out that it is not
optimal for the intermediary to monitor a loan.
Lemma 7 The solution to Problem (P4) dictates that for r1 ￿ e r and v ￿ 0:
231. m1=k = 0,





Proof. Contained in Appendix 11.1.
Take the situation where r1 = e r. Here the intermediary makes zero pro￿ts on a loan of any
size that it makes to the ￿rm, because the lemma implies that I(￿;v) = (r1 ￿ e r)k. Recall
that the dotted straight line in Figure 5 portrays the intermediary￿ s pro￿ts when there is no
monitoring. It becomes horizontal at the original when r1 = e r. If r1 > e r unbounded pro￿t
opportunities exist for both the ￿rm and intermediary. Both parties￿pro￿ts are increasing in
loan size, k. The dotted straight line in Figure 5 now moves up from the origin. Obviously,
an equilibrium cannot exist here.
Corollary 1 An equilibrium does not exist when r1 > e r for any project type.
6.2.1 The Loan Portfolio
Which unmonitored projects will be funded and how much will they get? To answer this
question, let ￿1 ￿ maxf￿1g, and assume that this occurs for a unique value of ￿2. Denote
the measure of such projects by #(￿1;￿2), which is presumed to be greater than zero. Now,
suppose that the equilibrium wage rate w is set at w = !, where ! is determined by the
equation
R(￿1;!) = e r: (24)
Observe that if R(￿1;!) = e r for some ￿1 = ￿1, then R(￿1;!) < e r for all ￿1 < ￿1. Hence, all
projects with ￿1 < ￿1 will be monitored at the wage !, if they are funded. Alternatively,
suppose that R(￿1;w) = e r for some ￿1 < ￿1 and wage rate w. Then, R(￿1;w) > e r. But,
by Corollary 1 such an equilibrium cannot exist. Therefore, in equilibrium only one type
of project will not be monitored, viz projects of type (￿1;￿2). This can only happen at the
equilibrium wage w = !.
24Next, using Lemma 1, when there is no monitoring a contract for a type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rm
will specify a loan size of k = v=[￿2(r2 ￿ r1)], where r1 = R(￿1;!) and r2 = R(￿2;!). The
￿rm￿ s rents are linear in loan size since v = k￿2(r2 ￿ r1). The intermediary￿ s pro￿ts are
zero for any loan size. Therefore, the ￿rm would like to obtain as big a loan as possible. As
a consequence, any equilibrium where type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms are not monitored will involve the
rationing of credit.
7 Stationary Equilibrium
The focus of the analysis will be on stationary equilibria, from here on out. First, the
labor-market-clearing condition for the model will be presented. Second, a de￿nition for
a stationary equilibrium will be given. Third, it will be demonstrated that a stationary
equilibrium for the model exists.
7.1 Labor Market
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that all loans are monitored. Only ￿rms
with ￿ 2 A(w) will be producing output. Recall that the economy has one unit of labor in
aggregate. The labor-market-clearing condition will then appear as
Z
A(w)
[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) + ￿2l2(￿1;￿2) + ￿1lm1(￿1;￿2)]dF(￿1;￿2) = 1, for w > !. (25)
Second, suppose that some ￿rms are credit rationed. When there is credit rationing, the wage
rate is given by w = !. In this case, the aggregate amount of labor hired by type-(￿1;￿2)
￿rms, or #(￿1;￿2)[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) + ￿2l2(￿1;￿2)], is given by




[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) + ￿2l2(￿1;￿2) + ￿1lm1(￿1;￿2)]dF(￿1;￿2), for w = !,
where A(!)=￿1 refers to the active set of monitored loans excluding type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms. From
the ￿rm￿ s problem (P2) it is apparent that ￿1l1(￿1;￿2)+￿2l2(￿1;￿2) is a function of the size of
the loan to a type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rm, k(￿1;￿2). Therefore, when there is credit rationing, condition
25(26) is implicitly determining the quantity of capital that is rationed out to type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms.
Equivalently, (26) can be thought of as determining the value of a credit-rationed ￿rm by
using the relationship v = k￿2(r2 ￿ r1).
7.2 De￿nition of a Stationary Equilibrium
It is now time to take stock of the situation so far by presenting a de￿nition of the equilibrium
under study. It will be assumed that the economy rests in a stationary state.
De￿nition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is described by a set of labor allocations,
l and lm, a ￿nancial contract, fp1;p2;p12;p21;k;m1;m2g, a set of active monitored ￿rms,
A(w) and ￿rm values v, and rental and wage rates, e r and w, such that:
1. Firms hire labor, l, so as to maximize their pro￿ts in accordance with (P2), given prices
and the contract o⁄ered by intermediaries.
2. The ￿nancial intermediary o⁄ers a contract, fp1;p2;p12;p21;k;m1;m2g, which maxi-
mizes its pro￿ts in accordance with (P3), given prices and the value of ￿rms. The labor
used in monitoring is given by lm = (m=z)￿.
3. The set of active monitored ￿rms, A(w), and their values, v, are speci￿ed by the fact
that the intermediary makes zero pro￿ts on each type of loan, so that (21) and (22)
hold.
4. The wage rate, w, and the value for a type-(￿1;￿2) credit-rationed ￿rm, v, are deter-
mined so that one of the following holds:
(a) w > !, where the lower bound on wages, !, is de￿ned by (24). Here there is no
credit rationing, and (25) holds.
(b) w = !, so that there is credit rationing, and the value for a type-(￿1;￿2) credit-
rationed ￿rm, v, is determined by (26).
5. The interest rate, e r, is given by e r = 1=￿ ￿ 1 + ￿.
7.3 Existence
In a stationary equilibrium (with no growth) the interest rate facing consumers will be locked
in at b r = 1=￿ ￿ 1, a fact evident from examining the consumer￿ s Euler equation (1) in a
steady state. The cost of capital for the intermediary will then be e r = 1=￿￿1+￿. Therefore,
26demonstrating that a stationary equilibrium exits is equivalent to showing that either there
is a w > ! that solves (25), or a value of #(￿1;￿2)[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) + ￿2l2(￿1;￿2)] ￿ 0 that is
consistent with (26) when w = !. The situation is portrayed in Figure 8, which graphs the
demand and supply for labor. Some features of the demand schedule for labor will now be
discussed.
The demand for labor is portrayed by the solid line. The properties of this demand
schedule are established during the course of the proof for Lemma 8. Above the wage rate !
there is no credit-rationing. Here the aggregate demand for labor is given by the left-hand
side of (25), denoted by Ld. In this region (w > !) the demand schedule is downward
sloping. As the wage rate approaches the upper bound that maintains pro￿tability for
￿rms, b w = max
￿2T
fW(￿)g, the demand for labor goes to zero. When wages drop to ! the
economy enters into the situation where there is credit rationing. Recall that wages cannot
fall below the level !. If they did, then r1 = R(￿1;w) > R(￿1;!) = e r. This would imply
that in￿nite pro￿ts could be reaped from loans to type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms. Such an equilibrium
cannot exist￿ recall the discussion regarding Corollary 1. Therefore, the demand for labor
schedule becomes perfectly elastic at the wage rate, w = !. Note that when there is credit
rationing the demand schedule starts to the left of Ld, evaluated at the point w = !. To
understand why, let Ld
=￿1 represent the aggregate demand for labor when there is no credit
rationing and the use of labor for type-(￿1;￿2) projects has been subtracted out.8 This
curve obviously lies to the left of Ld. In a situation with credit rationing the intermediary is
indi⁄erent about the size of the loan it makes to a type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rm. Hence, the demand for
labor schedule starts at the point Ld
=￿1; i.e., at point showing the demand for labor by all the
other projects in the active set excluding the type-(￿1;￿2) ones. Note that there will be two
equilibria when the supply schedule, Ls, lies in the range between Ld
=￿1 and Ld at the wage
rate w = !: the equilibrium with w > ! will not involve credit rationing, while the other




A(!)=￿1[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) +￿2l2(￿1;￿2) +￿1lm1(￿1;￿2)]dF(￿1;￿2), where A(!)=￿1 refers to the













Figure 8: Existence, demand and supply for labor
with an increase in z. Hence, credit rationing will be more likely at low levels of ￿nancial
development.
Once a solution for the wage rate is found other variables of interest can be recovered,
such as k, m1=k, p1, p2, and v using (10), (17), (12), (13), (22), etc.
Lemma 8 There exists a stationary equilibrium for the economy.
Proof. See Appendix 11.1.
288 The Impact of Technological Progress on the Econ-
omy
The primary goal of the analysis is to understand how technological advance in the ￿nancial
sector a⁄ects the economy. To this end, the impact that technological progress, in either the
￿nancial or production sector, has on the portfolio of funded projects will be characterized.
To develop some intuition for the economy under study, three special cases will be examined.
8.1 Balanced Growth
In the ￿rst special case, technological progress in the ￿nancial sector proceeds in balance with
the rest of the economy. Speci￿cally, assume that the economy is moving along a balanced
growth path where the ￿
1=￿
i ￿ s grow at the common rate g1=￿ and z grows at rate g1=(1￿￿).
Therefore, Ft+1(￿1;￿2) = Ft(￿1=g;￿2=g). The salient features of this case are summarized by
the proposition below.
Proposition 1 (Balanced growth) Along a balanced growth path the capital stock, k, wages,
w, and rents, v, will grow at rate g1=(1￿￿) with the cost of capital given by e r = g1=(1￿￿)=￿ ￿
1+￿. The amount of resources devoted to monitoring per unit of capital, m1=k, will remain
constant.
Proof. Refer to Appendix 11.1.
In this situation the ￿nancial sector is not becoming more e¢ cient over time, relative to
the rest of the economy. The amount of monitoring done per unit of capital invested remains
constant over time. Thus, the probability of a ￿rm getting caught by misrepresenting a high
level of earnings, P21(m1=k), is constant over time too. For any particular project type, the
spread between the return on capital (net of labor costs) and the interest earned by investors,
￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r, is ￿xed over time.
8.2 E¢ cient Finance
The above case suggests that for technological progress in the ￿nancial sector to have an
impact it must outpace advance in the rest of the economy. Suppose that this is the case.
29Then, one would expect that as monitoring becomes more e¢ cient those projects o⁄ering
the lowest expected return will be cut.
Proposition 2 (Technological progress in ￿nancial intermediation) Consider z and z0 with
z < z0. Let w and w0 be the wage rates associated with z and z0, respectively. Then,
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Proof. See Appendix 11.1.
An increase in z makes ￿nancial intermediation more e¢ cient, proved that all loans are not
credit rationed. For any given wage rate, w, the aggregate demand for labor will increase
for two reasons. First, more capital will be lent to each funded project. Second, more labor
will also be hired by the intermediary to monitor the project. Since the demand for labor
rises, the wage rate must move up to clear the labor market. This increase in wages causes
the set of active projects, A(w), to shrink, with the projects o⁄ering the lowest expected
return being culled.
An extreme example of the above proposition would be to assume that z grows forever.
Then, the ￿nancial sector will become in￿nitely e¢ cient relative to the rest of the economy.
This leads to the second special case.
Proposition 3 (E¢ cient ￿nance) Suppose T is a compact and countable subset of R2
+, with




z!1m1=k = 1 and lim
z!1Pij(mi=k) = 1 for i;j = 1;2;
3. lim
z!1pi = rik and lim
z!1pij = rik for i;j = 1;2;
4. lim

































Proof. Refer to Appendix 11.1.
As the cost of monitoring borrowers drops, the intermediation sector becomes increas-
ingly e¢ cient. The ￿nancial intermediary can then perfectly police loan payments without
devoting a signi￿cant amount of resources in terms of labor to this activity, as points (1)
and (2) in the proposition make clear. Since ￿rms are operating constant-returns-to-scale
production technologies no rents will accrue on their activity￿ see point (5). Firms must
pay the full marginal product of capital to the intermediary￿ point (3). In this world only
projects with the highest return are ￿nanced, as point (4) states, even though they may be
the most risky. In the aggregate any idiosyncratic project risk washes out. Therefore, in the
absence of a contracting problem, only the mean return on investment matters. And, with
constant-returns-to-scale technologies everything should be directed to the most pro￿table
opportunity. The wage rate, w￿, and aggregate capital stock, k￿, in the e¢ cient economy are
determined in standard fashion by the conditions that the marginal product of capital for
the most pro￿table projects must equal the user cost of capital, 1=￿￿1+￿ and the fact that
the labor market must clear. These two conditions yield (28) and (27). (By comparison, con-
sider the standard deterministic growth model with the production technology o = ￿k￿l1￿￿
and one unit of aggregate labor. Here w￿ ￿ ￿￿=(1￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[￿
1=￿=(1=￿ ￿ 1 + ￿)]￿=(1￿￿) and
k￿ ￿ [￿=(1=￿ ￿ 1 + ￿)]1=(1￿￿)(￿
1=￿)
￿=(1￿￿). The di⁄erences in the formulae are due to two
facts that pertain to the current setting: (i) the best projects from a portfolio T are chosen;
(ii) there is uncertainty in ￿.)
8.3 Equilibrium Credit Rationing
Alternatively, technological advance could occur in the production sector and not the ￿-
nancial one. Here, the lack of development in the ￿nancial sector will hinder growth in
31the rest of the economy. Speci￿cally, technological advance in the production sector of the
economy will drive up wages. This leads to the costs of monitoring rising. Therefore, less
is done. This lack of scrutiny by intermediaries now allows ￿rms with marginal projects
o⁄ering low-expected returns to receive funding.
Proposition 4 (Technological progress in production) Suppose all the ￿
1=￿
i ￿ s increase by the
factor g1=￿, holding z ￿xed. Then, the set of active projects, A(w), expands with the new
projects o⁄ering lower expected returns than the old ones.
Proof. See Appendix 11.1.
An extreme case of the above proposition would be to consider a primitive economy
where there has been no ￿nancial development. In particular, shut down the monitoring
technology by letting z become arbitrarily small. As z drops it becomes more expensive to
monitor to loans. Capital accumulation in the economy falls and wages drop. Eventually,
wages hit the lower bound !. At this point, it no longer pays to monitor type-(￿1;￿2) loans.
As z continues to drop capital is redirected away from the ￿xed set of monitored loans,
A(!), toward credit-rationed projects. Eventually, all loans are made to credit-rationed
type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms. The aggregate capital stock in the economy where all loans are credit
rationed, denoted by k, lies below what would obtain in the economy with e¢ cient ￿nance,
k￿.




A(w) kdF(￿) = 0;
2. lim
z!0k = k ￿ 1=f(￿1(￿1)1=￿ + ￿2￿
1=￿
2 )[(1 ￿ ￿)=!]
1=￿g < k￿:
Proof. For the last time, go to Appendix 11.1.
9 Numerical Example
The theoretical mechanisms developed above are now illustrated with a numerical example.
Before proceeding a caveat is in order. The example suggests that the impact of ￿nancial
32intermediation on economic activity may be large. In truth, the model would need to be
re￿ned further to make such statements with any con￿dence. Some potential re￿nements
are discussed in the conclusions.
To simulate the model, values must be assigned to its parameters. The parameter values
used are presented in Table 1. Capital￿ s share of income, ￿, is chosen to be 0:30, a very
standard number. Likewise, the depreciation rate, ￿, is set to 0:06, again a very common
number. The chosen value for the discount factor, ￿, implies that the interest rate earned by
savers is 7:5 percent. This is a bit higher than Cooley and Prescott￿ s (1995, p. 19) estimate
of 6:9 percent for the real return to capital over the postwar period. Note that the concept
used for the capital stock is much narrower here, though; i.e., it is just the stock of business
capital. Therefore, hitting the low observed capital-output ratio is harder. Nothing is known
about an appropriate choice for the parameters governing monitoring by the intermediary,
viz ￿,  , and ￿. The selection of a value for ￿ amounts to a normalization (relative to some
baseline level of z). The other two parameters are more important, but the features of the
model reported below turn out to be robust for a wide number of choices. In the example
1,000 values for ￿rm type, or ￿ ￿ (￿1;￿1), are drawn from the distribution F. Let ￿m be the
mean across ￿rms of expected total factor productivity (TFP); i.e., ￿m =
R
(￿1￿1+￿2￿2)dF.
Likewise, ￿v will denote the mean over ￿rms of the logarithm of the volatility of TFP; i.e.,
￿v =
R
ln[￿1￿2(￿2 ￿ ￿1)2]dF. In a similar vein, ￿ will denote the correlation between the
means and (ln) volatilities of ￿rm-level TFP, while ￿2
m and ￿2
v will denote the variance of these
￿rm-level variables. Assume that these means and (ln) volatilities of ￿rm-level ln(TFP) are
distributed according to a bivariate normal, N(￿m;￿v;￿2
m;￿2
v;￿). The parameters selected
for ￿m;￿v;￿2
m;￿2
v, and ￿ imply that the standard deviation of TFP across active ￿rms lie in
the 0.264 to 0.284 range, at least for values of z that result in the model exhibiting capital-
to-output ratios that are in accord with the postwar data. (This latter property is discussed
more below.) This is a bit higher than the 0.20 value reported by Foster, Haltiwanger and
Syverson (2005, Table 1, p. 38). The slightly higher value used here helps the model ￿t the
data in the cross-country analysis conducted in Section 9.1.
33Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter De￿nition Basis
￿ = 0:3 Capital￿ s share of income Standard value
￿ = 0:06 Depreciation rate Standard value
￿ = 0:93 Discount factor Cooley and Prescott (1995)
￿ = 1 Pr of detection, constant Normalization
  = 0:95 Pr of detection, exponent Arbitrary
￿ = 1:57 Monitoring cost function
￿m = 5; ￿v = 0 means Foster et al. (2005)
￿2
m = 2:56; ￿2
v = 0:1225; ￿ = 0:95 variances and correlation
#(T ) = 1;000 # of feasible projects Arbitrary
To illustrate the impact that ￿nancial intermediation has on the economy, the model is
simulated for various levels of the state of technology in the ￿nancial sector, or z. Look at
the upper panel of Figure 9, ￿rst. Note that the capital-to-output ratio for the economy
mimics the increase observed in the data over the postwar period for z 2 [400;1300]. In
particular, the model hits the observed capital-to-output ratios for 1962 and 2000. To match
this increase, z must rise at approximately 3:2% per year. This may be reasonable, if one
believes this period coincides with an information technology revolution. Additionally, other
factors may also have been at work in causing the economy￿ s capital-to-output ratio to rise,
such as declines in the rate of capital income taxation or drops in the prices of capital goods.
The goal here is not to decompose the rise in the capital-to-output ratio into its underlying
causes. Instead, it is merely to illustrate how improvements in ￿nancial intermediation will
have this e⁄ect.
Table 2 details the results. Here, the aggregate value for a variable is indicated in bold,
so that x =
R
A(w) xdF for x = m1, w￿1(m1=z)￿, k, etc. The expected value for x is given
by x ￿
R
A(w) dF. Monitoring becomes less expensive as z rises. This results in the amount
of monitoring per unit of capital rising, as re￿ ected in the larger values for m1 ￿ k. As a
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Figure 9: The impact of technological improvement in the ￿nancial sector on the capital-to-
output ratio
consequence, the likelihood of intermediaries detecting fraud increases. The fraction of a
￿rm￿ s output dissipated in pure rents, v ￿ o, declines. This can be seen another way. The
internal rate of return, i, earned by a ￿rm on its investment is given by i = ￿1r1+￿2r2￿￿. The
average internal return earned by ￿rms, weighted by their level of investment, will then be




A(w) dF]. Likewise, denote the average rate of return earned





The gap between these two returns, e ￿ i￿e i, measures the average excess return earned by
￿rms due to rents. This excess return is squeezed as rents shrink. In similar fashion, the
average spread between the rates of return that intermediaries and savers earn, s ￿ e i ￿ b r,
re￿ ects the costs of intermediation incurred by the necessity to monitor borrowers. This
interest rate spread declines as the costs of intermediation fall due to technological progress
in information production. Rousseau (1998, Figure 4) presents evidence suggesting that
￿nancial innovation reduced loan-deposit spreads in the U.S. between 1872 to 1929. Li
and Sarte (2003, Table 3) present evidence suggesting that drops in the cost of ￿nancial
intermediation account for a signi￿cant part of long-run ￿ uctuations in U.S. manufacturing
35output.
As rents get squeezed, ￿rms o⁄ering the lowest expected return are culled. In particular,
the number of active ￿rms,
R
A(w) dF, is reduced. This results in the average level of expected
TFP across ￿rms, (￿1￿1+￿2￿2) ￿
R
A(w) dF, rising. On this, Levine (2005, Table 4) reports
that the (exogenous component of) ￿nancial development is associated empirically with
improved productivity. A rise in the probability of detecting fraud relaxes the incentive
constraint (8), and makes it easier to lend more capital to ￿rms. The result is an increase
in the amount of capital invested per ￿rm, as re￿ ected by an upward movement in the
economy￿ s capital-to-output ratio, k￿o. Denote the levels of capital and output that would
obtain in the ￿rst-best economy by k￿ and o￿. As can be seen, capital and output steadily
rise, relative to their ￿rst-best outcome, as z moves up. Note ￿nance is important in the
model.
36Table 2: Impact of Technological Progress
in the Financial Sector
Technology, z z = 40 z = 400 z = 1300
Monitoring-to-capital, m1 ￿ k 1.818 3.312 5.363
Monitoring cost to output, w￿1(m1=z)
￿ ￿ o 0.057 0.032 0.021
Monitoring labor share, li ￿ 1 0.075 0.044 0.029
Pr of detecting fraud, P12 ￿
R
A(w) dF 0.416 0.673 0.791
Rents to output, v ￿ o 0.126 0.071 0.046
Measure of active ￿rms,
R
A(w) dF 109 14 5
TFP, (￿1￿1+￿2￿2) ￿
R





A(w) dF 0.247 0.264 0.284
Internal return (weighted), i 0.287 0.146 0.114
Lending rate,e i 0.141 0.097 0.087
Excess return, e = i ￿e i 0.146 0.049 0.027
Interest rate spread, s =e i ￿ b r 0.066 0.022 0.012
Return to savers, b r = 1=￿ ￿ 1 0.075 0.075 0.075
Capital-to-output ratio, k ￿ o 0.864 1.456 1.726
Capital relative to ￿rst best, k ￿ k￿ 0.218 0.511 0.670
Output relative to ￿rst best, o ￿ o￿ 0.561 0.778 0.860
The upshot of all this is that as z moves up the ￿nancial system becomes more e¢ cient.
Figures 9 and 10 summarize the situation well. The lower panel of Figure 9 illustrates how
the model economy￿ s capital-to-output ratio monotonically increases with z. As z becomes
large it approaches the capital-to-output ratio that would occur in the economy without
informational frictions. The model is consistent with the upward trend in the capital-to-
output ratio displayed in Figure 2. Figure 10 shows how at low levels of z many ine¢ cient
projects are funded. As z moves up ine¢ cient projects are culled and capital is redirected
toward projects that have higher expected returns. The importance of such reallocation
e⁄ects for cross-country income di⁄erences has been noted by Restuccia and Rogerson (2004),
37although they emphasize ine¢ ciencies due to policy distortions. To paraphrase Goldsmith
(1969), technological progress in the ￿nancial sector promotes economic development by
facilitating the migration of funds to the best user, i.e., to the place in the economy where
the funds will earn the highest social return. Since all investment funds are borrowed in the
model economy, the ratio of business debt to GDP rises, too. Likewise, the value of ￿rms to
GDP increases as well. Thus, the model is congruent, in a qualitative sense, with the ￿rst
two facts presented in Figure 1.
9.1 Cross-Country Evidence
Ever since Goldsmith (1969), economists have been interested in the cross-country relation-
ship between ￿nancial structure and economic development. An implication of the current
model is that as the state of technology in the intermediation sector advances the spread
between borrowing and lending rates in an economy will shrink, while its capital-to-output
ratio and level of aggregate output increases. The cross-country data is suggestive of such a
relationship, as Figure 3 shows.
For the cross-country analysis assume that production in an economy is now undertaken




where x is a country-speci￿c productivity factor. The model provides a mapping between a
country￿ s level of output, o, and its capital/output ratio, k=o, on the one hand, and the state
of technology in its production and ￿nancial sectors, x and z, on the other. Represent this
mapping by (o;k=o) = M(x;z). Now, while the state of a country￿ s ￿nancial technology is
unobservable directly, this mapping can be used to make an inference about (x;z), given an
observation on (o;k=o), by using the relationship (x;z) = M￿1(o;k=o). This is done for a
sample of 40 countries, using the parameter values listed in Table 1. The results are reported
in Table 6 in in Appendix 11.2. By construction the model explains all the variation in output
and capital/output ratios across countries. Still, one can ask how well the model explains














































































































Mean of TFP Std. dev. of TFP
z = 1300
Figure 10: The impact of technological progress in the ￿nancial sector on investment in ￿rms
39Additionally, one could ask how well the measure of the state of technology in the ￿nancial
sector that is backed out using the model correlates with independent measures of ￿nancial
intermediation. Here, take the ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other ￿nancial
institutions to GDP as a measure of ￿nancial intermediation, as reported by Beck et al.
(2001). (Other measures produce similar results but reduce the sample size too much.)
Table 3 reports the ￿ndings. Take the results for the benchmark calibration ￿rst; i.e.,
the ￿rst column of numbers. As can be seen, the interest-rate spreads predicted by the
model are positively associated with those in the data. The correlation is reasonably large.
The correlation between the imputed state of technology in the ￿nancial sector and the
independent measure of ￿nancial intermediation is quite high. Interestingly, Finland and
Peru both have a capital-to-output ratio of about 1.6. The model predicts that the former￿ s
z is 594, compared with 124 for the later￿ again, see Table 6 in Appendix 11.2. Why?
Finland has a much higher level of income per worker and hence TFP than does Peru ($40,603
versus $10,200). Therefore, given the higher wages, monitoring will be more expensive in
Finland. To give the same capital/output ratio, e¢ ciency in Finland￿ s ￿nancial sector must
be higher. Also interestingly, the three countries with the lowest z￿ s, Bolivia, India and Sri
Lanka, have credit-rationing equilibriums where some loans are not monitored. That these
two correlations aren￿ t perfect, should be expected. There are other factors, such as the big
di⁄erences in public policies discussed in Parente and Prescott (2000), which may explain
a large part of the cross-country di⁄erences in capital/output ratios. Additionally, there is
a lot of noise in these numbers given the manner of their construction￿ see Appendix 11.2.
The model￿ s predictions for aggregate total factor productivity display a high correlation.
Finally, the last columns report the results of some sensitivity analysis. Here  , ￿, and ￿ are
changed, one at a time, away from their benchmark value. The results do not change much
with moderate departures away from the benchmark parameterization.
40Table 3: Cross-Country Evidence
Parameters values
Benchmark Sensitivity analysis
  ￿ ￿
(change to)
  0.95 0.75 0.95 0.95
￿ 1.57 1.57 1.4 1.57
￿ 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.75
Correlation(model, data)
interest-rate spread 0.461 0.449 0.418 0.683
TFP 0.971 0.970 0.971 0.959
￿nancial intermediation 0.446 0.426 0.447 0.418
9.1.1 How Much Does Financial Development Matter?
It is now possible to gauge how important e¢ ciency in the ￿nancial sector is for economic
development, at least in the model. To this end, note that the best ￿nancial and industrial
practices in the world are given by x = maxfxig and z = maxfzig, respectively. Represent
country i￿ s output, as a function of the e¢ ciency in its industrial and ￿nancial sectors, by
oi = O(xi;zi). If country i could somehow adopt the best ￿nancial practice in the world
it would produce O(xi;z). Similarly, if country i used the best practice in both sectors it
would attain the output level O(x;z). The shortfall in output from the inability to attain
best practice is O(x;z) ￿ O(xi;zi).
The percentage gain in output for country i by moving to best ￿nancial practice is given
by 100￿[lnO(xi;z)￿lnO(xi;zi)]. The results for this experiment are plotted in Figure 11.
As can be seen, the gains are quite sizeable. On average a country could increase its GDP
by 11%. The country with the worst ￿nancial system, Sri Lanka, would experience a 23%
rise in output. While sizeable, these gains in GDP are small relative to the increase that
is needed to move a country onto the frontier for income, O(x;z). The percentage of the
41gap that is closed by a movement to best ￿nancial practice is measured by 100￿[O(xi;z)￿
O(xi;zi)]=[O(x;z)￿O(xi;zi)]. Figure 12 plots the reduction in this gap for the countries in
the sample. The average reduction is this gap is only 14%. For most countries the shortfall
in output is accounted for by a low level of total factor productivity in the non-￿nancial
sector.
Therefore, the importance of ￿nancial intermediation for economic development depends
on how you look at it. World output would rise by 21% by moving all countries to the best
￿nancial practice￿ see Table 4. This is a sizeable gain. Still, it would only close 9% of the
gap between actual and potential world output. Dispersion in cross-country output would
fall by 8 percentage points from 77% to 64%.9 Financial development explains about 19%
of the cross-country dispersion in output by this metric. Last, it will be noted that the model
could be make an inference about productivities in the production and ￿nancial sectors, x
and z, by using interest rate spreads, s, instead of the capital output ratio, k=o; i.e., by using
the mapping of the form (x;z) = f M￿1(o;s).10 Very similar results are obtained￿ Table 5.
Table 4: World-Wide move to financial best practice, z
Increase in world output (per worker) 21%
Reduction in gap between actual and potential world output 9%
Fall in dispersion of output across countries, std(ln(oi)) 13% = (77% -64%)
9 The impact of ￿nancial intermediation on income will be larger if the former is allowed to a⁄ect
TFP in the production sector more directly. Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2005) develop a model where
entrepreneurs produce an intermediate good that is important for the production of ￿nal output. A limited
ability to enforce ￿nancial contracts leads to a poor selection of entrepreneurs in the economy. A related
analysis is in Amaral and Quinton (2005). This channel of e⁄ect may be important because Levine (2005)
documents that ￿nancial development has a causal impact of productivity.
10 Erosa (2001) uses interest-rate spreads to quantify the e⁄ects of ￿nancial intermediation on occupational
choice. In the current setting the relationship between interest-rate spreads and output is \ shaped. This
non-monotonicity results from the fact that at low levels of productivity in the ￿nancial sector some loans are
not monitored. For these loans the interest-rate spread between what the intermediary receives on its loans
and what it pays savers will be zero. Therefore, as the prevalence of credit-rationing increases interest-rate
spreads will fall. As a result of this non-monotonic relationship, some care must be used when matching the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: The impact of a move to ￿nancial best practice on the gap in GDP per worker
44Table 5: World-wide move to best fin. prac., z
[alternative results obtained when using interest-rate spread match, (x;z) = f M￿1(o;s)]
Increase in world output (per worker) 18%
Drop in shortfall between actual and potential world output 8%
Fall in cross-country dispersion of output, std(lnoi) 9% (= 84% -75%)
10 Conclusions
What is the link between state of ￿nancial intermediation and economic development? This
question is explored here by embedding a costly-state veri￿cation model into the standard
neoclassical growth paradigm. The model had several key features. There is a distribution of
￿rm types o⁄ering di⁄erent combinations of risk and return. Firms raise capital from ￿nan-
cial intermediaries. Intermediaries borrow from savers. The ex post return on a project is
private information. The terms of a loan are determined by an optimal incentive-compatible
contracting scheme between the ￿rm and intermediary. The ￿rm repays the intermediary
an amount that is contingent upon the return it reports. An intermediary can audit the
reported return. The likelihood of a successful audit depends upon both the amount of
resources devoted to monitoring and the technological state of the auditing technology. The
inability to audit perfectly, and therefore the necessity to rely on incentive-compatible con-
tracts, implies that ￿rms can earn rents. As a result, deserving ￿rms are underfunded and
undeserving ones are overfunded.
As the e¢ cacy of auditing increases due to technological progress in the ￿nancial sector
the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial intermediation improves. This is manifested in several ways. First,
rents are squeezed. This is re￿ ected in a narrowing of the wedge between a ￿rm￿ s internal
rate of return on investment and the e⁄ective lending rate at which it borrows from the
intermediary. Second, as the costs of monitoring fall the spread between the return received
by the intermediary on monitored loans and what it pays to savers shrinks. Third, over time
unproductive projects are winnowed out of the intermediary￿ s loan portfolio and capital is
redirected toward the more pro￿table ones. This is re￿ ected by both an increase in the
45economy￿ s level of TFP and a rise in its capital-to-output ratio. A numerical example
suggests that the mechanism outlined could have quantitative signi￿cance.
Extensions of the above framework are easy to envision. The most natural one would
be to allow for long-term contracts. Gertler (1992) is an early example of this approach.
More recently, Smith and Wang (2006) embed a long-term contracting framework into a
model of ￿nancial intermediation. Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) and Quadrini (2004)
have examined the properties of dynamic contracting for ￿rm ￿nance in worlds with private
information and obtain relatively simple solutions. Whether or not a simple solution to
the above costly-state veri￿cation contracting problem exists is an open question.11 If the
framework does not admit a tractable theoretical solution, the work could proceed numer-
ically. It would be nice to combine this analysis with a model of entry and exit by ￿rms,
along the lines of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1992). Here, ￿rms face diminishing returns to
scale in production and consequently earn pro￿ts. These pro￿ts are whittled away, ex ante,
by free entry into production, subject to an entry cost. On the one hand, one might expect
that long-term contracts would mitigate the informational problem. On the other hand,
pro￿ts will now be larger, ceteris paribus, due to diminishing returns in production and the
fact that they will be capitalized over a ￿rm￿ s lifetime. Therefore, free entry combined with
the opportunity to capture larger pro￿ts, may lead to more ine¢ cient ￿rms being ￿nanced
in equilibrium. How all of this will play out, is anyone￿ s guess.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Theory
Proof for Lemma 1. First, substitute the promise-keeping constraint (9) into the objective
function to rewrite it as
(￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r)k ￿ ￿1w(m1=z)
￿ ￿ ￿2w(m2=z)
￿ ￿ v:
Next, it is almost trivial to see that optimality will dictate that p12 = r1k and p21 = r2k,
since this costlessly relaxes the incentive constraints (7) and (8). Next, drop the incentive
constraint (7) from problem (P3) to obtain the auxiliary problem now displayed:
e I(￿;v) ￿ max
p1;p2;m1;k
f(￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r)k ￿ ￿1w(m1=z)
￿ ￿ vg; (P6)
subject to
p1 ￿ r1k; (29)
49p2 ￿ r2k; (30)
[1 ￿ P21(m1=k)](r2k ￿ p1) ￿ r2k ￿ p2; (31)
and
￿1(r1k ￿ p1) + ￿2(r2k ￿ p2) = v: (32)
The strategy will be to solve problem (P6) ￿rst. Then, it will be shown that (P3) and (P6)
are equivalent. Problem (P6) will now be solved. To this end, note the following facts:
1. The incentive constraint (31) is binding. To see why, suppose not. Then, reduce m1
to increase the objective.
2. The constraint (30) is not binding. Assume, to the contrary, it is. Then, (31) is
violated. This transpires because the right-hand side is zero. Yet, the left-hand side is
positive, given that p1 ￿ r1k < r2k, so that [1 ￿ P21(m1=k)](r2k ￿ p1) > 0.
3. The constraint (29) is binding. Again, suppose not, so that p1 < r1k. It will be shown
that exists a pro￿table feasible deviation from any contract where this constraint is
slack. Speci￿cally, consider increasing k very slightly by dk > 0 while adjusting p1 and
p2 in the following manner so that (31) and (32) still hold. Also, hold m1 ￿xed. The


















Note that such an increase in k will raise the objective function.
It will now be demonstrated that the optimization problems (P3) and (P6) are equivalent.
First, note that e I(￿;v) ￿ I(￿;v), because problem (P6) does not impose the constraint (7).
50It will now be established that e I(￿;v) ￿ I(￿;v). Consider a solution to problem (P6). It
will be shown that this solution is feasible for (P3). On this, note that Fact 1 implies that
r2k ￿ p2 = [1 ￿ P21(m1=k)](r2k ￿ p1) ￿ r2k ￿ p1;
so that
p1 ￿ p2:
Now, set m2 = 0 in (P3), which is feasible but not necessarily optimal. Then, constraint (7)
becomes p1 ￿ p2, which is satis￿ed by the solution to (P6). Therefore, e I(￿;v) ￿ I(￿;v).
Last, with the above facts in hand, recast the optimization problem as
I(￿;v) ￿ max
p2;m1;k
f(￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r)k ￿ ￿1w(m1=z)
￿ ￿ vg;
subject to
r2k ￿ p2 = (r2 ￿ r1)k[1 ￿ P21(m1=k)];
and
r2k ￿ p2 = v=￿2:
The above two constraints collapse in the single constraint (10), by eliminating r2k ￿ p2,
that involves just m1 and k. The problem then appears as (P4). ￿
Proof for Lemma 2. Suppose that the solution dictates that m1=k ￿ 1=￿. Then, from
(P4) it is clear that the optimal solution will dictate that m1=k = 0. This transpires because
P21(m1=k) = 0 for all m1=k ￿ 1=￿, yet monitoring costs are positive for all m1=k > 0. Next,
by substituting (10) into (P4) it is easy to deduce that the intermediary￿ s pro￿t function
can be written as
I(￿;v) = [
￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r
￿2(r2 ￿ r1)
￿ 1]v =
r1 ￿ e r
￿2(r2 ￿ r1)
v; when m1=k ￿ 1=￿, (33)
Q 0 as r1 Q e r.
Therefore pro￿ts are negative if r1 < e r and v > 0. Hence, a contract will not be o⁄ered
when m1=k ￿ 1=￿. (The above equation gives the dashed straight line plotted in Figure 5.)
￿
51Proof for Lemma 3. By inspecting (17), the ￿rst two results follow immediately. The
last result follows from evaluating (17) at m1=k = 1=￿ and solving for the threshold v, or v.
Above this level no monitoring will occur since the interior solution for m1=k is decreasing
in v. ￿
Proof for Lemma 4. The ￿rst result is obvious. For the second point, di⁄erentiate
with respect to v. Note, that the exponent on the ￿rst v will be ￿=( ￿ + ￿ ￿  ) ￿ 1 < 0.
Hence, this term will go to 1 as v becomes small. Simple di⁄erentiation establishes the





￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r
￿2(r2 ￿ r1)










￿ < 0: ￿
Proof for Lemma 5. Necessity: From (17) it is clear that an interior solution cannot
exist when ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r < 0 and v > 0, for any ￿ 2 T . If v = 0 then k = 0 by (10),
which implies no funding. When ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r = 0 then v = 0 for ￿nite ￿￿ s. Again, an
interior solution will not exist, because k = 0 when v = 0.
Su¢ ciency: Suppose that ￿1r1+￿2r2￿e r > 0 for some ￿ 2 T . By equation (19) it is clear
that there will exist a v > 0 such that I(￿;v) > 0, since q > 0 when ￿1r1+￿2r2￿e r > 0. The
issue is whether or not there will be an interior solution associated with this. By Lemma 4
it is clear that there will exist a V (￿) < V (￿) such that I(￿;V (￿)) = 0; i.e., for v = V (￿)
the solution to the contracting problem will be interior. ￿
Proof for Lemma 7. Suppose r1 ￿ e r. By condition (33) when there is no monitoring
I(￿;v) = f(r1￿e r)=[￿2(r2￿r1)]gv so that the intermediary makes nonnegative pro￿ts. From
Lemma (1) it is easy to deduce that when there is no monitoring a contract will specify
a loan size of k = v=[￿2(r2 ￿ r1)]. Will the intermediary monitor the project? Note that
when there is an interior solution to the contracting problem, k and v will be determined
in accordance with (22) and (23). In particular, both k and v will be bounded. The ￿rm
will earn rents in amount v = ￿2(r2 ￿ r1)[1 ￿ P12(m1=k)]k and the intermediary makes zero
pro￿ts. Now, without monitoring the intermediary could o⁄er the ￿rm a loan of the same
size k. The intermediary earns nonnegative pro￿ts with no monitoring, but the return for
52the ￿rm will be higher because v = ￿2(r2 ￿ r1)k > ￿2(r2 ￿ r1)[1 ￿ P12(m1=k)]k. If the
intermediary tried to o⁄er a contract with monitoring that o⁄ered this higher level of v (or
an even larger one) it would earn negative pro￿ts. ￿
Proof for Lemma 8. To prove the lemma, three facts about aggregate labor demand
when all loans are monitored, or the left-hand side of (25), will be established. First, labor de-
mand is a continuous and decreasing function in wages, w. Second, as w ! b w ￿ max
￿2T
fW(￿)g
the left-hand side of (25) converges to 0. Third, as w ! 0 labor demand approaches 1.
Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem there will exist a (single) value of w that sets
the left-hand side to 1, or labor supply.
If the value of w that sets the left-hand side of (25) equal to one occurs below !, then
the equilibrium wage is !. In this situation there is credit rationing and the demand for
labor by unmonitored type-(￿1;￿2) projects is determined residually by (26). When w = !
the intermediary doesn￿ t care about the size of the loan that it makes to type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms.
Therefore, the amount of labor hired by these ￿rms can be anything depending on the
size of the loans that are made in equilibrium. Consequently, the aggregate demand for
labor with credit rationing is a horizontal line emanating from the point w = ! that starts
at
R
A(!)=￿1[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) +￿2l2(￿1;￿2) +￿1lm1(￿1;￿2)]dF(￿1;￿2), where A(!)=￿1 is the active
set of projects with type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms purged. This starting point must lie to the left of
aggregate demand for labor when all loans are monitored, evaluated at the point w = !,











[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) + ￿2l2(￿1;￿2) + ￿1lm1(￿1;￿2)]dF(￿1;￿2) = L
d;
then two equilibria will exist. In the ￿rst equilibrium w = ! and there is credit rationing.
Here, the aggregate amount of labor used by type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms will be determined residually
by (26). In the second there is no credit rationing. The wage rate w > ! clears the labor
market in line with (25).
53The above three facts about the aggregate demand for labor when all loans are monitored















￿gdF = 1: (34)
This equation will determine the equilbrium wage rate, w, when w > !.
To begin with, let Ld(w;￿;z) represent the demand for labor by both the ￿rm and














The ￿rst term in Ld(w;￿;z) represents the demand for labor by a type-￿ ￿rm. It will be
decreasing in w if k is. On this, rewrite equation (23) as
k = ￿(￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2 ￿ e rw
(1￿￿)=￿)







where ￿i ￿ ￿(1￿￿)(1￿￿)=￿￿
1=￿
i and ￿ ￿ ( ￿+￿￿ )￿=( ￿￿ )( 1
 )￿ =( ￿￿ )( 1
 ￿+￿)(￿+ )=( ￿￿ ).
Note the following things about this solution for k: (i) The level of investment in a ￿rm, k ,
is continuously decreasing in w; (ii) k ! 0 as w ! w = W(￿) = [(￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2)=e r]￿=(1￿￿)
(when z is ￿nite); (iii) k ! 1 as w ! 0; (iv) k is increasing in z. Therefore, it is easy to
see that the demand for labor by the ￿rm shares these properties.
Now, switch attention to the second term in Ld(w;￿;z). This represents the demand for
labor by the intermediary for monitoring a project of type ￿. After a little work on (16),
while making use of (22), an expression for m1=k can be obtained:
m1=k = (
 ￿ + ￿ ￿  




Note that m1=z = m1=k ￿ k ￿ z. Therefore, equations (36) and (37), in conjunction with
the de￿nition for q, imply
m1=z = ￿(￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2 ￿ e rw
(1￿￿)=￿)
( +1)=( ￿￿ )w
￿1=[￿(￿￿1)]z
1=(￿￿1); (38)
54where ￿ ￿ ￿[( ￿ + ￿ ￿  )=( ￿ + ￿)]￿1= f￿ =[￿2(￿2 ￿ ￿1)]g1=( ￿￿ ). Note that following
things about this solution for m1=z: (i) m1=z is continuously decreasing in w; (ii) m1=z ! 0
as w ! w = W(￿) ￿ [(￿1￿1 +￿2￿2)=e r]￿=(1￿￿) (when z is ￿nite); (iii) m1=z ! 1 as w ! 0;
(iv) m1=z is increasing in z. Therefore, it is easy to see that the demand for labor by
intermediaries shares these properties.
Thus, demand for labor by a type-￿ active project has the following properties: (i)
Ld(w;￿;z), is continuously decreasing in w; (ii) limw!w Ld(w;￿;z) = 0; (iii) limw!0 Ld(w;￿;z) =






Ld(w;￿;z); for w ￿ w = W(￿),
0; for w > w = W(￿).
(39)






e Ld(w;￿;z)dF(￿). To summarize, the aggre-
gate demand for labor when all loans are monitored,
R





e Ld(w;￿;z)dF(￿) is continuously decreasing in w;
2. limw!b w
R
T e Ld(w;￿;z)dF(￿) = 0, where b w = max￿2T W(￿);
3. limw!0
R
T e Ld(w;￿;z)dF(￿) = 1;
4.
R
T e Ld(w;￿;z)dF(￿) is continuously increasing in z. ￿




















[￿2(r2 ￿ r1)]￿ gdF = 1: (40)
Now, if consumption grows a rate g1=(1￿￿) the Euler equation (1) dictates that the interest
rate will given by b r = e r ￿ ￿ = g1=(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ 1. Next, suppose at some point in time that
a solution, k, m1=k, w, and v and, has been found to (10), (17), (22) and (40). Then,
55k0 = g1=(1￿￿)k, w0 = g1=(1￿￿)w, v0 = g1=(1￿￿)v, and (m1=k)0 = m1=k will solve this equation
system for the subsequent period. Take equation (10). Note that the ri￿ s will remain constant
under the conjectured solution. Hence, the proposed solution solves this equation. Next,
turn to (17). Again, the conjectured solution will solve this equation. The active set A(w)
will not change￿ equation (21). Therefore, it is easy to see from (40) that the labor-market
clearing will still hold. Last, equation (22) will still hold￿ note that q is constant while s
grows that the same rate as w and z. ￿
Proof for Proposition 2. First, point 4 in the proof of Lemma 8 established that the
aggregate demand for labor is continuously increasing in z. Therefore, at a given wage rate
the demand for labor rises as z moves up. In order for equilibrium in the labor market to
be restored, wages must increase, since the demand for labor is decreasing in wages￿ Point





2 )=(1=￿ ￿1+￿)]￿=(1￿￿). It￿ s trivial to see that as w rises the
set of ￿ 2 T satisfying this restriction, or A(w), shrinks; if ￿ = (￿1;￿2) ful￿lls the restriction
for some wage it will meet it for all lower ones too, yet there will exit a higher wage that





Therefore, those ￿￿ s o⁄ering the lowest expected return will be cut ￿rst as w rises. ￿










A￿ dF > 0. Take any equilibrium wage w. From (21) it is immediate that if









2 . Hence, A￿ v A(w) for all w. In equilibrium the
wage will be a function of z, so denote this dependence by w = W(z). Now, let z ! 1. It
will be shown that w = W(z) ! w￿, where
w
￿ ￿ ￿




1=￿]=(1=￿ ￿ 1 + ￿)g
￿=(1￿￿): (41)
56To see why, suppose alternatively that w ! e w 6= w￿. First, presume that e w < w￿. Then, by
(20) all projects of type ￿ 2 A￿ will be funded since their cuto⁄ wage is W(￿) = w￿ > e w.
From equations (35), (36) and (39) it is clear that limz!1 e Ld(W(z);￿;z) = 1, for ￿ 2 A￿.
Since,
R
A￿ dF > 0, this implies that limz!1
R
T e Ld(W(z);￿;z)dF = 1. Therefore, such an
equilibrium cannot exist because the demand for labor will exceed its supply. Second, no ￿rm
can survive at a wage rate bigger than w￿, by (20). Here, limz!1
R
T e Ld(W(z);￿;z)dF = 0.
This establishes (27). Last, note that A(w￿) = A￿.
It is immediate that A￿ v limw"w￿ A(w), because ￿ 2 A￿ is viable for all wages w ￿
w￿ = W(￿) by (20). It is also true that limw"w￿ A(w) v A￿, since from (20) any project
￿ = 2 A￿ requires an upper bound on wages W(￿) < w￿ to survive; that is, for any ￿ = 2
A￿ there will exist some high enough wage w such that W(￿) < w < w￿. Therefore,
limw"w￿ A(w) = A￿ = A(w￿). This establishes Point 4 of the Proposition.
To have an equilibrium it must be the case that k < 1 for ￿ 2 A￿. From equation
(36) this can only happen when e rw(1￿￿)=￿ ! ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2 at a rate of no slower than
O(z￿ =( =￿+ )). This implies that lim
z!1(m1=z)￿ = 0. For 0 < lim
z!1(m1=z)￿ < 1 it must hap-
pen that e rw(1￿￿)=￿ ! ￿1￿1+￿2￿2 at rate O(z￿ =(1+ ). Since O(z￿ =(1+ ) < O(z￿ =( =￿+ )),
lim
z!1(m1=z)￿ = 0. Hence, lim
z!1m1=z = 0. Using this result and (41), in conjunction with the
labor-market-clearing condition (34), then leads to (28). Likewise, equation (22) implies that
lim
z!1v = 0. Hence, it is easy to see that pi = rik and pij = rik solve the contracting problem
(P3) when v = 0. Using equation (37) it is apparent that lim
z!1m1=k = 1. Consequently, a
false report by a ￿rm will be caught with certainty, or lim
z!1Pij(m1=k) = 1. ￿
Proof for Proposition 4. Let the ￿
1=￿
i ￿ s increase by the common factor g1=￿ > 1.
Suppose that wages grow by g1=(1￿￿). Now, focus on the labor-market-clearing condition
(40). Take the ￿rst term behind the integral, which gives the demand for labor by a ￿rm.
Under this conjectured solution for wages, the ri￿ s will remain constant. It is easy to see from





grows by the factor g￿1=(1￿￿). Therefore, for the demand for labor by ￿rms and intermediaries
to remain constant v must grow by g1=(1￿￿). From equation (22) it is easy to calculate that
57it grows by less than this; speci￿cally, it grows at rate g￿1=[(1￿￿)(￿￿1)]￿ note that s grows at
the same rate as w, and q is constant. Hence, the demand for labor by ￿rms drops. The
demand for labor by intermediaries also decreases. To see this, turn to the second term. All
variables in this term are constant, except for v, which declines as just mentioned. Therefore,
wages must rise by less than g1=(1￿￿), since the demand for labor is decreasing in w (as was
established in the proof of Lemma 8). The active set, A(w), will therefore expand, because
￿1r1 + ￿2r2 increases. ￿
Proof for Proposition 5. Let z ! 0. It will be shown ￿rst that limz!0 w = !. To
demonstrate this point, recall from the proof of Lemma 8 that the wage rate, w, will decline
as z falls. Suppose instead that w approaches w > !; i.e., a wage rate for which there is
no credit rationing. From (35) to (39), it is easy to see that limz!0 e Ld(w;￿;z) ! 0. Labor
demand will fall short of labor supply as z ! 0, the desired contradiction.





dn(!;k;￿1;￿2;z) = 1: (42)
In this expression Ld(!;￿;z) represents the demand for labor by a type-￿ monitored project
at the wage rate !. This function is determined by (35), (36) and (38). Recall that A(!)=￿1
refers to the active set of projects excluding type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rms. The term Ldn(k;￿1;￿2;z) rep-





2 )[(1 ￿ ￿)=!]
1=￿ k. Thus, the above condition represents one equation in
one unknown, k. A type-(￿1;￿2) ￿rm earns rents in the amount v = ￿2(r2￿r1)k. Therefore,
the credit-rationed ￿rm￿ s value is determined by the labor-market-clearing condition. As z
falls in the credit-rationing regime the active set A(!)=￿1 remains constant because wages
are ￿xed at the lower bound !. Funding for a project in the active set will go to zero using
(36), while assuming that w = !.







2 )[(1 ￿ ￿)=!]
1=￿:
58Next, it is apparent from (35) that Ld(!;￿;z) ! 0 as z ! 0, because k ! 0 and m=z ! 0


















￿ Figure 1: The numbers represent total debt outstanding for nonfederal businesses (ex-
cluding ￿nancial business) relative to gross domestic business value added (excluding
gross farm value added). The source of the data for the value of ￿rms relative to GDP
is Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001, Figure 1, p. 1204). Last, the numbers on the size of the
￿nancial intermediation sector represent the gross value added of ￿nancial corporate
business taken from the National Income and Product Accounts.
￿ Figure 2: To construct this ￿gure, a series for the intangible stock of capital is con-
structed by backing out the implied data series on investment in intangibles that is
reported in Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006, Figure 1). Speci￿cally, a capital stock
series for intangibles is constructed by iterating on the law of motion k0
i = (1￿￿i)ki+ii,
where ki is the current stock of intangible capital, ii is investment in intangibles, and
￿i is the depreciation rate on intangibles. Two issues arise with this procedure. First,
what is the depreciation rate on intangible capital? A weighted average of the rates
reported in Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006, p. 23) suggests that it should be 33%.
McGrattan and Prescott (2006, p. 782) feel that an upper bound of 11% is appropri-
ate. Taking a simple average of these two numbers gives 22%, the value used here.
Second, what starting value for the intangible stock of capital should be used? Along
a balanced growth path the stock of intangible capital is given by ki = ii=(g + ￿i),
where g is the growth rate of GDP. This formula is used to start the capital stock o⁄
in 1947, where g is assigned a value of 0:015. The stock of intangible capital is then
59simply added to private nonresidential nonfarm ￿xed assets. The resulting series is
divided through by nonfarm business GDP.
￿ Section 9.1: The data for the interest-rate spread is taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (2000, 2001). It is de￿ned as the accounting value of bank￿ s net interest
as a share of their interest-bearing (total earning) assets. The numbers for the ratio
of private credit to GDP are also reported there. The other numbers derive from the
Penn World Tables, Version 6.1￿ see Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). The capital
stock for a country, k, is computed for the 1990-2000 sample period using the formula
k = i=(g +￿), where i is gross investment, g is the growth rate in investment, and ￿ is
rate of depreciation. This formula heroically assumes that an economy is on a balanced
growth path. The depreciation is taken to be 0.06. The growth rate for investment is
calculated from the investment data reported in the tables for the period 1950-2000.
Investment is recovered by using data on investment￿ s share of GDP and GDP. The
average capital-to-GDP ratio over the period for each country is used. A country￿ s
total factor productivity, ￿, was computed using the formula ￿ = (y=l)=(k=l)￿, where
y is GDP, l is aggregate labor, and ￿ is capital￿ s share of income. A value of 0.30
was picked for ￿. Aggregate labor is backed out using data on per-capita GDP, GDP
per worker, and population. The numbers in the analysis are reported in Table 6. In
this table an asterisk attached to a country indicates that the assumption r1 < e r for
all project types is not ful￿lled. Here the economy has a credit-rationing equilibrium
where some projects are monitored and others are not.
60Table 6: Cross-country numbers, data and model
Data Model
Country GDP k/o TFP Spread ￿n. z Spread x ￿GDP gap g
p.w. dev. p.w.
Sri Lanka* 7013 0.774 491 0.051 0.339 3.4 0.019 0.245 0.225 73689 0.065
India* 5121 0.787 394 0.030 0.512 2.8 0.026 0.198 0.229 75582 0.047
Bolivia* 6779 0.839 468 0.035 0.441 4.9 0.049 0.246 0.241 73923 0.068
Morocco 11419 0.884 654 0.036 0.576 9.9 0.063 0.353 0.238 69284 0.120
Mauritius 23705 0.892 1091 0.032 0.683 21.2 0.063 0.587 0.232 56997 0.294
Nicaragua 5923 0.915 435 0.234 5.7 0.060 0.220 0.230 74779 0.055
Colombia 12332 0.935 693 0.064 0.402 12.9 0.058 0.363 0.221 68371 0.120
Philippines 7864 1.054 481 0.042 0.890 12.3 0.046 0.251 0.189 72838 0.059
Costa Rica 13913 1.085 721 0.052 0.158 24.2 0.044 0.369 0.179 66790 0.106
Uruguay 20251 1.099 901 0.056 0.266 36.9 0.043 0.477 0.174 60451 0.165
Honduras 6823 1.120 439 0.069 0.282 13.3 0.041 0.221 0.173 73879 0.045
Brazil 18001 1.170 836 0.120 0.538 41.5 0.038 0.427 0.157 62701 0.125
Turkey 14340 1.179 720 0.094 0.336 34.0 0.037 0.363 0.156 66363 0.094
Mexico 22100 1.257 952 0.053 0.556 67.4 0.032 0.479 0.138 58603 0.141
Argentina 25056 1.291 1016 0.082 0.335 85.2 0.030 0.517 0.130 55646 0.157
Ireland 46945 1.355 1573 0.016 0.977 195.7 0.027 0.786 0.114 33758 0.418
UK 39908 1.416 2018 0.020 2.481 202.5 0.024 0.689 0.104 40794 0.266
Panama 15255 1.532 705 0.020 0.692 114.9 0.019 0.341 0.090 65448 0.054
US 57151 1.578 1720 0.039 3.297 508.7 0.017 0.849 0.075 23551 0.460
Portugal 30350 1.596 1111 0.035 1.046 289.3 0.016 0.542 0.077 50352 0.116
Italy 50569 1.610 1559 0.036 1.104 510.3 0.016 0.773 0.071 30133 0.299
Spain 40138 1.639 1332 0.038 1.279 455.9 0.015 0.652 0.068 40564 0.169
Iceland 39834 1.639 1321 0.940 453.3 0.015 0.649 0.068 40868 0.166
Peru 10200 1.655 503 0.072 0.312 124.0 0.014 0.249 0.072 70503 0.026
Finland 40603 1.695 1319 0.016 1.551 593.6 0.013 0.648 0.059 40099 0.148
Netherlands 46929 1.758 1435 0.015 2.430 949.6 0.011 0.706 0.049 33773 0.164
France 45317 1.758 1407 0.035 1.592 917.4 0.011 0.689 0.049 35385 0.152
Denmark 44024 1.759 1374 0.049 1.741 894.0 0.011 0.675 0.049 36678 0.143
Canada 45933 1.781 1424 0.018 1.706 1057.9 0.010 0.691 0.045 34769 0.145
New Zealand 36422 1.794 1195 0.025 1.363 911.6 0.010 0.586 0.044 44280 0.089
Australia 45907 1.824 1405 0.019 1.470 1387.7 0.009 0.683 0.038 34795 0.122
Belgium 50839 1.862 1490 0.023 1.487 1985.5 0.008 0.727 0.032 29863 0.130
Luxembourg 80702 1.881 2048 0.007 2.064 3610.8 0.008 1.000 0.025 0 1.000
Austria 45560 1.884 1385 0.019 1.143 2085.4 0.007 0.670 0.029 35142 0.000
Japan 37061 1.917 1212 0.018 3.043 2155.0 0.007 0.575 0.026 43641 0.000
Israel 40777 1.933 1272 0.033 0.979 2672.0 0.006 0.613 0.023 39926 0.000
Thailand 11632 1.995 543 0.030 1.786 1230.1 0.005 0.251 0.021 69071 0.000
Norway 47845 2.112 1374 0.031 1.403 18840.1 0.002 0.662 0.001 32857 0.000
Switzerland 45706 2.122 1335 0.016 3.464 21532.3 0.002 0.640 0.000 34996 0.000
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